The signing and ratification of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea No. 374-FZ of November 9, 2024 has become one of the most discussed events in international politics. This document not only symbolizes the strengthening of relations between the two countries, but also significantly affects the security dynamics in East Asia. Particularly discussed was Article 4, which provides for mutual military assistance in the event of an attack by third parties.
However, the significance of the treaty is broader than just military aspects. It is an indicator of changes in regional strategies, touching upon issues of economy, security and global influence. Vice-President of the International Congress of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, candidate of political sciences, member of the public chamber of Primorsky Krai, chairman of the Primorsky "Society of Friendship with Korea" Evgeny Rusetsky explained in more detail why this document caused such lively discussions.
Historical context and strategic continuity
The signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and the DPRK in 2024 refers us to the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK of 1961. Particular attention from Russian and foreign experts is drawn to Article 4 of the 2024 Treaty, according to which "if one of the parties finds itself in a state of war due to an armed attack by one or more states, the other party shall immediately provide it with military assistance by all available means in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation." This provision is almost completely identical to Article 1 of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK of 1961, with the exception of the mention of the UN Charter and the internal laws of Russia and North Korea. At that time, the Soviet Union acted as the guarantor of Pyongyang's security in the context of the Korean conflict. However, with the collapse of the USSR, North Korea lost an important ally, which forced it to rely on its own forces, including the development of its own missile programs and nuclear potential.
In 2024, the situation looks different: Russia, under pressure from sanctions, returns to an active policy in East Asia, seeking to increase its influence. The DPRK, in turn, faces unprecedented isolation, especially after the tightening of sanctions from 2006 to the present, aimed at limiting its missile and nuclear programs.
In such conditions, the partnership between the two countries takes on new meaning. For Russia, this clause confirms its readiness to support the DPRK in conditions of international isolation. For North Korea, this is a symbol of protection, allowing it to strengthen its position in negotiations with the international community. This agreement also provides a legal basis for developing cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere, including joint exercises and joint coordination of actions in the sphere of joint defense. Russian President Vladimir Putin did not rule out the possibility of holding joint military exercises between Russia and North Korea. Speaking on November 7 in Sochi at a plenary session of the Valdai International Discussion Club, he referred to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed between Russia and North Korea in June of this year: "There is also Article 4, which speaks of mutual assistance in the event of aggression from another state."
The President added that the agreement clearly defines the contours of cooperation between Russia and North Korea.
The signing and ratification of the Treaty and its subsequent implementation are taking place against the backdrop of high activity by the armed forces of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan in the area of the Korean Peninsula. For example, in November of this year alone, the armed forces of these countries. The ROK, the US, and Japan conducted joint air exercises involving a B-1B bomber east of Jeju Island on November 3. During the exercises, South Korean, American, and Japanese fighters escorted a US heavy bomber over waters where the ROK and Japanese air defense identification zones intersect. The exercises, which were conducted without live firing, demonstrated the bomber's "overwhelming" capabilities in striking a simulated target. From November 6 to 8, the South Korean armed forces conducted regular defensive exercises on islands in the Yellow Sea near the western inter-Korean maritime border. The exercise involved about 6,600 personnel from the Marine Corps, Navy, Army, and Air Force, 10 ships, and 35 South Korean aircraft. The program included practicing joint actions with local authorities and medical personnel to help evacuate island residents in the event of an emergency. On November 6, the South Korean armed forces conducted live-fire missile interception exercises, demonstrating their air defense capabilities. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the exercises took place off the country's west coast and involved the Cheongun II and Patriot systems. The Cheongun II is a South Korean missile defense system used to intercept enemy missiles at altitudes of 3 to 40 kilometers.
The second international Freedom Edge exercise this year involving troops from the ROK, the US, and Japan took place from November 13 to 15 in international waters south of Jeju Island. The program included a number of operations involving the naval and air forces of the three countries, aimed at strengthening regional security and responding to possible threats. The maneuvers involved various types of warships and aircraft. In particular, the US involved the nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington. There were training sessions involving modern fifth-generation fighters, naval missile defense exercises, anti-submarine operations, anti-piracy exercises, missile defense, and cyber defense exercises.
In turn. On November 5, the DPRK launched a series of short-range ballistic missiles from the outskirts of the city of Sariwon in North Hwanghae Province, which flew about 400 km. The launches were carried out using KN-25 multiple launch rocket systems. On October 31, Pyongyang test-fired a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwason-19. And the list goes on. According to the KCNA news agency, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said on November 21 at the opening ceremony of an arms exhibition called "National Defense Development 2024": the United States is "strengthening military alliances and deploying strategic nuclear weapons aimed at North Korea." In light of this reality, North Korea "realizes every day and every hour that achieving the most powerful military capabilities is the only way to maintain peace and a reliable guarantee of security and development."
An analysis of the military activity situation on the Korean Peninsula gives grounds to draw a certain parallel with the development of the confrontation between Russia and NATO countries in the Ukrainian conflict. Both are showing a constant increase in the level of military confrontation and escalation of conflicts.
These circumstances can either facilitate or complicate negotiations on possible options for resolving these conflicts for the new administration of US President-elect Trump. But unlike the Ukrainian conflict, Trump has a certain positive lead in the Korean conflict. During his previous presidential term, he held two direct meetings with the head of state of the DPRK Kim Jong-un (June 2019 in Korea and February 2019 in Vietnam). It is important with what potential both sides will approach possible negotiations. And the fact that consultations between the US and the DPRK will begin quite actively after January 20, 2025, can be predicted with great confidence. The North Korean problem will quickly come to the forefront of the political agenda of the new US administration under the leadership of Donald Trump. This was also stated by former Assistant Secretary of State and US Special Representative for North Korean Issues Stephen Biegun. Speaking at a forum in Washington on November 12, he noted that "the North Korean problem will not remain unresolved for long."
And a certain window of opportunity for settling the Korean conflict may be opened by the Treaty between Russia and the DPRK. In the foreground of conflict resolution is always the question: who will give what security guarantees to both Korean states.
Let us dwell on the security guarantees for the Republic of Korea from the United States, which have existed for several years. The United States and the Republic of Korea have a "Mutual Defense Treaty" in force, according to which an attack on either side from the Pacific Ocean will cause a response from both. In 1967, this mutual defense treaty obliged South Korea to send a large military contingent to support the United States in the Vietnam War. Does this fact not evoke certain analogies with today? In November 2023, the Ministers of Defense of the Republic of Korea and the United States, Shin Won-sik and Lloyd Austin, held an annual bilateral meeting on security issues, following which the parties signed an updated "adapted deterrence strategy" in relation to the DPRK. This document was updated in accordance with the development of the DPRK's missile and nuclear programs and its nuclear doctrine. Also, L. Austin declared the United States' commitment to "extended deterrence", which is understood as the readiness of the American side to use all means, including nuclear ones, to protect an ally.
The southern peninsula hosts a large contingent of U.S. forces, numbering between 28,000 and 38,000 troops at various times. The bulk of the force is under the United States Forces Korea (USFK). USFK is a subcommand under the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). USFK includes U.S. combat-ready forces and components under the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), the ultimate command for all South Korean and U.S. land, air, maritime, and special operations component commands. The major elements of USFK include the Eighth United States Army (EUSA), United States Air Forces Korea (U.S. Seventh Air Force), United States Naval Forces Korea (CNFK), United States Marine Corps Forces Korea (MARFORK), and United States Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR). The ROK/United States Combined Forces Command (CFC) is the joint combatant headquarters comprising the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and the United States Forces Korea. Since November 2022, CFC has been headquartered at Camp Humphreys, in Pyeongtaek, Korea, one of the largest U.S. military bases in the world, comparable in size and importance to Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. CFC is commanded by a U.S. Army four-star general, with a ROK Army four-star general serving as deputy commander. The American general also serves as commander of the United Nations Command and commander in chief of U.S. Forces Korea. The ROK/US Combined Forces Command has operational control over more than 600,000 active-duty troops from both countries. In wartime, that number would expand to include about 3.5 million ROK reservists, as well as additional U.S. forces deployed outside the ROK.
It should also be noted that the Republic of Korea bears the bulk of the costs of maintaining American troops in Korea. In November of this year, the Republic of Korea and the United States signed the 12th agreement on special measures, which sets out the parties' shares in the costs of maintaining American troops on the Korean Peninsula for the period from 2026 to 2030. In 2026, the South Korean share of the costs will increase by 8.3% compared to the previous year, and subsequently the annual increase in costs will correspond to the inflation rate.
What security guarantees exist for the DPRK? Until November 2024, before the ratification of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and the DPRK, no international security guarantees for Pyongyang actually existed, according to international law. The DPRK leadership saw its security guarantees only in the intensive development and strengthening of its defense capability. And despite the negative reaction of the media in the US, Japan and the Republic of Korea, it can be stated that the signing of the treaty with Russia, in our opinion, radically changes this situation and opens up opportunities for dialogue between the parties.
The main issue in this dialogue of all participants in this process will be the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And it can be assumed that Russia could provide guarantees of the nuclear security of the DPRK, take the DPRK under its nuclear "umbrella" on the basis of the signed treaty and with the consent of the DPRK first of all and in consultations with the PRC, the USA, the Republic of Korea and Japan. Whether the parties will take advantage of this window of opportunity remains an open question. But once again we note that the legal basis for this is laid down by the Treaty. In this regard, it is important to note that the DPRK leadership has also taken specific steps in domestic and foreign policy over the past year to remove possible suspicions from the Republic of Korea, the USA and Japan of some kind of doctrinal "aggressiveness".
Political Changes in the DPRK: Ready for Dialogue?
The key event of the last year was the change in the rhetoric of the DPRK regarding unification with South Korea. If earlier the unification of the two Korean states was a strategic goal, enshrined in the programmatic doctrinal documents of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Constitution of the DPRK, now this issue has been removed from the agenda. In the decisions of the Central Committee of the WPK, sessions of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, the goals and theses on the mandatory unification of Korea have been removed. They are absent. The last of this series of events was the changes to the text of the national anthem and the name of the anthem itself. As reported by the KCNA news agency, the changes were made on October 24 at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly. It adopted the Law on the National Anthem of the DPRK. If earlier the anthem was called "Aegukka", that is, the national anthem, now it is called "The National Anthem of the DPRK". As for the text, one of the verses sounded as follows: "My homeland, the beauty of which extends for three thousand li." Now it reads: "My homeland is the most beautiful country in the world." That is, the reference to the Korean Peninsula stretching for three thousand li has been removed, since North Korea now considers itself a separate state from the ROK.
These changes can also become the basis for normalizing relations on the peninsula. They show that Pyongyang is ready to view South Korea as a separate independent state, and is pursuing a purely defensive, non-aggressive policy. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of conflict, and in the strategic perspective also creates the basis for negotiations on concluding a peace treaty between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea with security guarantees from Russia, China, and the United States, and creates the basis for starting the process of lifting international sanctions against the DPRK.